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OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL: EXISTING REGIME AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
Norman A. Wulf*
Abstract
The existing arms control regime for
outer space bans attacks on satellites of
other countries, except as acts of selfdefense.
The moon and other celestial
bodies cannot be used for military activities. Detonating nuclear explosives in
outer space is prohibited. Deployment in
space of nuclear weapons or other weapons
of mass destruction is prohibited. Development, testing, or deployment of spacebased anti-ballistic systems or their components by the United States or the Soviet
Union is prohibited.

the satellites of another country, except
when engaged in individual or collective
self-defense. While this rule is not
stated explicitly in existing international
law, it is nonetheless implicitly and
clearlr set forth in the Outer Space
Treaty and the UN Charter.
Let us begin our examination with
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty.
It
states in pertinent part:
Outer space '"
shall be free for
exploration and use by all States
without discrimination of any
kind, on a basis of equality and
in accordance with international
law ....

Proposals that outer space be demilitarized or that anti-satellite weapons be
banned create complex problems. Since all
space activities have potential military
uses, great care would have to be taken in
defining precisely what a proposal to
demilitarize space is meant to prohibit.
Similarly, many space objects have the
capability to be used to damage or destroy
space objects. Any reasonable definition
of anti-satellite weapon will leave uncontrolled some non-weapon systems that have
a residual anti-satellite capability.
Daunting problems of verification and the
disparity between the current relevant
space capabilities of the United States and
the Soviet Union add further complexity.

The basic law applicable to outer space is
set forth in this article -- outer space
is open to all States for use and exploration. Destroying a satellite operated by
a foreign state violates this basic right
by depriving that State of the use of
outer space.
Of course, all rights are subject to
certain limitations and this right is no
exception. Article IX of the Outer Space
Treaty states in part:

While it is unreasonable to conclude
that demilitarization of space or a ban on
ASAT weaponry are panaceas, it is also unreasonable to conclude that nothing useful
can be done in space arms control.

States Parties to the Treaty ...
shall conduct all their activities in outer space ... with
due regard to the corresponding
interests of all other States
Parties to the Treaty ....

Introduction

This limitation is an obvious one. If one
State in exercising its freedom to use
outer space conducts space activities in
total disregard of the space activities
conducted by another State, the latter
State's freedom to use space may be infringed.
Obviously, States in exercising
their outer space freedom must take
account of the freedom sought to be exercised by other states.

This paper seeks to summarize the
existing legal regime for arms control in
outer space and thereafter to comment on
some factors that influence the prospects
for new arms control constraints.
It will
be seen that a fairly extensive legal
regime for arms control in outer space
already exists.
It will also be seen that
factors influencing future outer space arms
control prospects are quite complex.
I.

A.

The Existing Regime

Protection of Satellites

A basic proposition is that under
existing international law no country can
damage,-destroy or forcibly interfere with
*Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.
20451 The views excressed herein are those
of the author and d~ not necessarily reflect
those of the U.S. Government or any agency
thereof.

It is worth pausing a moment to look
at the antecedents of this rule. An
analogous area in which a well-defined body
of law had been developed prior to the
Outer Space Treaty negotiations is the law
of the sea.
Indeed, the negotiators of
the Outer Space Treaty have acknowledged
their debt to this body of law and prac2
tice. Perhaps best reflective of the
customary rules of law of the sea was th3
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.
Article 2 of that Convention sets forth the
basic high seas rule:

This paper is declared a work of the U.S.
Government and therefore is in the public domain.
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The high seas being open to all
nations, no State may validly
purport to subject any part of
them to its sovereignty. Freedom

of the high seas is exercised
under the conditions laid down
by these articles and by the
other rules of international
law. It comprises, inter alia,
both for coastal and noncoastal States:
[Freedom of navigation, fishing,
overlight and the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines.)
These freedoms and others which
are recognized by the general
principles of international
law, shall be exercised by all
States with reasonable regard
to the interests of other
States in their exercise of
the freedom of the high seas.
This basic rule has operated as the peace4
time law for several centuries.
With
little more, this concept has allowed for
the use of the seas by all States with the
understanding that interference with the
activities of others is to be avoided.
In
short, the same basic rule that for centuries protected foreign ships from harm was
placed in the Outer Space Treaty and now
protects foreign satellites from harm.

this point, some doubt arguably might
exist about protection accorded space objects. Those doubts would be dispelled,
however, by Article III of the Outer Space
Treaty. It imposes an obligation on State
Parties to conduct their space activities
"in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations."
While the applicability of the Charter to
man's activities in space had been presumed
by many, this provis~on made its applicability clear to all.
The intricacies of
the Charter are beyond the scope of this
paper.
Suffice it for me to state that
the Charter's proscription on the "threat
or use of force", except when an act of
individual or collective self-defense,
applies to space objects -- space objects
whose ownership is not subject to question
as a result of Article VIII of the Outer
Space Treaty and whose right to be present
in space is clearly established by Article
I of the Treaty.
While it may have been preferable that
the Outer Space Treaty state explicitly
that space objects of a State shall not be
damaged or destroyed by other States,
there can be no question that the combined
effect of the Outer Space Treaty and the
UN Charter is to provide such protection.
There is, therefore, a peacetime legal
regime in place that implicitly precludes
a State from damaging or destroying
satellites of other States.

Law of the sea rules, however, required that jurisdiction over ships on the
high seas be assigned to some State. That
State is the State whosesflag the ship
flies -- the flag State. The Outer Space
Treaty specifies that the State Party "on
whose registry an object launched into
outer space is carried" -- the registry
State -6 has jurisdiction over the space
object.
Traditional maritime rules did
not readily transfer to space since an
unmanned ship on the high seas would be
considered abandoned and a legitimate
object of salvage. To prevent any concept
of salvage applying to unmanned orbiting
satellites, Article VIII makes clear that

B.

Prohibition of Certain Acts or Weapons

Having established that a principle
component of the existing arms control
regime for outer space is the implicit protection of satellites, this analysis now
examines other features of the existing
regime, specifically those rules prohibiting certain acts and those rules prohibiting certain weapons.
Traditional law of the sea rules prohibit two activities explicitly -- slave
trading and piracy.
What of outer space?
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty places
explicit prohibitions on military activities on celestial bodies:

Ownership of objects launched
into outer space, including
objects landed or constructed
on a celestial body, and of
their component parts, is not
affected by their presence in
outer space or on a celestial
body or by their return to
the Earth.

The moon and other celestial bodies
shall be used by all State Parties
to the Treaty exclusively for
peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases,
installations and fortifications,
the testing of any type of weapons
and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall
be forbidden.

Thus, the Outer Space Treaty firmly establishes that jurisdiction over a space
object is vested in the registry State and
that objects in space are not to be viewed
as abandoned or subject to salvage or
interference by other States. To summarize
the rules thus far, all States are free to
use outer space but they must do so with
regard to the use of space by others. The
fact that an object is in outer space does
not alter its ownership; jurisdiction over
the space object shall be in the registry
State.

This prohibition is patterned after Article I of the Antarctic Treaty that prohibited migitary activities on that frozen
continent.
Although some have made arguments to
the contrary, it is clear that the Outer
Space Treaty does not prohibit military
activities conducted elsewhere in outer

Were the analysis to be stopped at
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space than on the moon and other celestial
bodies.
Thus, there is no overall prohibition on military activities conducted in
Earth orbit. The practice of both major
space powers sUbstantiates this.
Limitations are in place with respect
to certain weapon systems, particularly
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction.
The 1963 Limited Test Ban
Treaty prohibits detonating a Yijclear explosive device in outer space.
The
Outer Space Treaty, some four years later,
prohibited placing nuclear weapons "or any
other kin~s of weapons otlmass destruction"
anywhere In outer space.
Weapons of mass
destruction include radiological, chemical
and biological weapons and any weapons
developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect
to those of nuclear wr2pons or other weapons mentioned above.
Beyond the nuclear realm but perhaps
approximating their destructive effect is
the ban on hostile use of environmental
modification techniques. The EnMod Convention not only prohibits hostile use of
environmental modification techniques in
space that result in widespread, longlasting or severe effects on Earth but also
such use !~at results in comparable effects
on space.
In the bilateral realm, the United
States and the Soviet Union have agreed in
the 1972 ABM Treaty not to develop, test,
or deploy anti-ballist-ic missile sys!~ms
or components which are space-based.
The ABM Treaty, however, does not preclude
research on such systems or components.

anti-satellite weapons. There are calls
for other measures as well, but I shall 15
confine myself to these two broad areas.
A.

Demilitarization of Outer Space

The first problem to be overcome is a
definitional one. What are military activities? Do they include military use of a
communication satellite? A navigation
satellite? Would such a ban extend to
military use of maps prepared through use
of remote sensing satellite imagery? Indeed, would one go so far as to ban weather
satellites because that information could
assist the military?
Or, perhaps at the other end of the
spectrum, would this ban be limited to
certain specific military actions? For
example, the Outer Space Treaty explicitly
prohibits placing on any celestial body
"military bases, installations and fortifications."
If this restriction were
made applicable to Earth orbit, would the
Soviet manned space station be a military
base? After all, it is manned by Soviet
military personnel. The response might
well be, no, because use of military
personnel does not automatically make the
activity a military activity.
Support for
this view would be found in Article IV
which, when talking about the prohibition
on military activities conducted on
celestial bodies, specifically allows military to be used. So, the mere fact that
the personnel on-board the spacecraft are
military, some would assert, does not make
that craft a military installation.
Perhaps, the definitional problem
could be reduced were military activities
to be defined as referring to weapons or
weapons systems. Thus, a military spacecraft would be a craft that has weapons
on board -- an armed craft. The term
"weapon", however, is not self-defining
and perhaps more specificity is needed here
as well.
Thus, it may be necessary to
speak in terms of weapons with the capability to damage or destroy targets in
space or targets on Earth or in the
Earth's atmosphere. However, there are
problems in doing this as well.

From this brief overview the existing
arms control regime for outer space can be
summarized as follows:
Damaging or destroying another
State's satellites is prohibited except
when an act of individual or collective
self-defense;
-- The moon and other celestial bodies
shall not be used for military activities;
-- Detonating nuclear explosives in
outer space is prohibited;

What activities would such a definition exclude? A satellite that transmitted
data to an Earth-based weapon system that
used that data to target an Earth-based
object would be excluded.
If targeting
satellites were to be included, the definition would have to cover not only those
space objects that have weapon systems on
board that are capable of damaging Earth
targets but also it would have to cover
space objects that assist Earth-based
weapon systems to target Earth targets.
How much assistance is enough? A navigational system that tells the weapon system
with precision where it is located may
assist that system in hitting its intended
target. What about maps made from satellite imagery? NOw, we are back to where we
started when we were speaking of the gener-

-- Deployment of nuclear weapons and
other weapons of mass destruction in outer
space is prohibited; and
-- Development, testing, or deployment
of space-based ABM systems or components by
the United States or the Soviet Union is
prohibited.
II. Future Prospects
There has been a great deal of attention given to possible further arms control
measures applicable to outer space.
Some
call for a complete ban on all military
activities in outer space -- demilitarization -- while others call for a ban on
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ality of the phrase "demilitarization of
space".

those fleets ply the depths as a deterrent to armed conflict and, if ~pterrence
fails, as a means of destroying enemy
warships and denying seaborne lines of
communication.

To me the conclusion is obvious. All
space activities have potential military
uses. To seek to "demilitarize space"
without a precise definition of what that
means is to ban nothing or to ban everything. Definitions are almost always
arbitrary, excluding certain items and including others.
If an approach that banned
certain weapons were to be pursued, great
care would have to be taken to define what
is prohibited. Parties to any such agreement would have to accept that the arbitrary definition will exclude activities or
systems that nonetheless have military
implications -- how serious those implications are will vary depending not only upon
the system themselves but also upon the
perception of the party.

In space, a variety of satellites are
pursuing their various activities protected by the peacetime rule of free use
with a duty of due regard for other
State's uses. These peacetime rules
obviously would not protect all satellites
during periods of conflict. Therefore,
proposals to ban anti-satellite weapons
have as their purpose not protection of
satellites in peacetime but their protection during armed conflict. As with the
proposal to ban submarines, the objective
of such a ban on ASAT weapons would be to
place a certain area or certain targets
out of reach during a conflict by denying
the sides the opportunity to develop and
test ASAT weapons before hand. Another
objective of a proposal to ban weapons
for destroying satellites would be to
avoid a racheting process of developing
ASAT weapons and developing counters to
such weapons. Achievement of these objectives, however, is frought with difficulties. Among them are problems of definition and verification. A separate problem
is the applicability of such a ban during
hostilities.

Another issue that must be dealt with
is verification. No party to an arms control agreement that deals with its fundamental national security interests can be
expected to base compliance upon trust of
the other party or parties.
It is the
lack of trust that leads to the arms the
agreements seek to control. Each party
must have the independent capability to
determine for itself whether the others are
complying with the agreement. While there
can be dispute as to how much verification
is necessary, there can be no dispute that
trust alone is inadequate.

The definitional problem is similar to
that encountered in the examination of
demilitarization and probably will require the same solution -- an arbitrary
definition. For example, a satellite with
a capability to maneuver could be used as
a weapon if it is maneuvered into a collision course with another satellite. Similarly, the docking of one satellite with
another provides a capability that also
could be used to maneuver a weapon close
to the satellite of another country. However, banning satellites with the ability
to maneuver or banning docking maneuvers
would place an unreasonable burden on
non-weapon uses of space. Another possibility would be a missile fired straight
up from the ground that detonates a conventional or nuclear warhead in proximity
to an orbiting satellite. Such ground
launched missiles have, and will continue
to have, important non-weapons uses so a
ban on such missiles cannot be considered
likely. Other examples could be given but
the point is clear.
It is not possible to
eliminate all systems that have a capability to damage or destroy satellites.
The focus, therefore, should be on systems
dedicated to the damage or destruction of
satellites or possibly on a discrete
category of actions or hardware that have
such distinct ASAT capability that the
non-weapon use must be sacrificed.
Such
a sacrifice would only occur when the
non-weapon use is not significant.

Such verification activities could
include the use of a variety of means
ranging from observation satellites to
review of the budgeting process and technical journals. The latter obviously is more
available for use by the Soviet Union in
verifying compliance by the United States
than is available to the United States in
verifying compliance by the Soviet Union.
A more detailed discussion of verification
is included in the following discussion
of anti-satellite systems.
B.

Anti-Satellite Systems

In the preceding section, reference
was made to the peacetime rules established
through the centuries for sea-going navigation -- freedom of the high seas combined
with a due regard for the exercise by
others. This basic regime did not prevail
in war time nor did the existence of this
rule prevent the development of vessels
whose only practical use at that time was
the destruction of vessels, i.e., the submarine. Following World War I, the United
States and Great Britain proposed that submarines be abolished altogether. This
proposal was not adopted but instead limitations on their use were subsequently
adopted at the London Naval Conference of
1930. Those limitations did not survive
World War II and now the use of submarines
in times ~~ hostilities is an accepted
practice.
While fleets of commercial
vessels ply the high seas on a routine
basis, submarines capable of sinking

Verifying whether a particular system
is a dedicated ASAT weapon or a system
that is engaged in non-weapon activities
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but has a residual ASAT capability is an
obvious problem of extreme complexity.
Even the technology and experience of
approaching a foreign satellite for purposes of verification paradoxically could
also enhance ASAT capabilities. Moreover,
a close approach would not always reveal
cases whether a particular space object
had a weapon on board.
If further arms
control agreements are to be pursued,
great care will obviously have to be exercised in defining their limits to ensure
that they are verifiable.

is that the agreement would seek to protect space objects to some extent during
armed hostilities by denying the parties
the opportunity to test and deploy certain
or all dedicated ASAT weapon systems
thereby denying the sides the assurance
that systems they ~ay wish to use during
armed hostilities would work. Some protection for satellites would result but
there would be uncertainty as to what
damage unproven or undedicated technology
might be able to inflict upon satellites
during hostilities.

Another complicating factor relates
to the role of arms control agreements
during a period of armed hostilities.
Some agreements denominated as Laws of
War are designed to be an~7are applicable
during armed hostilities.
Others are
clearly applicable during armed hostilities, although not specifically designated as laws of war -- the Environmen!~l
Modification Convention is an example.
Many arms control agreements clearly are
not applicable during armed hostilities.
The Limited Test Ban Treaty bans nuclear
explosions in the atmosphere but does not
purport to preclude use o!9nuclear weapons
during armed hostilities.
It is doubtful that either the Soviet Union or the
U.S. expect bilateral arms control agreements to be applicable during periods of
armed hostilities between them. Given the
nature of systems regulated and their possible use in a nuclear exchange, the possible non-applicability of the ABM Treaty
during armed hostilities is probably of
theoretical interest only. The adherence
by either Party to their existing policies
of interim restraint regarding the SALT I
Interim Agreement and SALT II during a
time of armed hostilities is probably even
more theoretical. These agreements obviously have as their primary purpose the
reduction of the risk of armed hostilities
and result in a limitation on destructive
capability should armed hostilities nonetheless occur.

This uncertainty is reduced for a
party that has proven technology and is
increased for a party that has technology
more or less under development.
Presently, the Soviet Union has a proven ASAT
capability that can damage or destroy
satellites in low Earth orbit. The U.S.
is developing a direct ascent interceptor
that is designed to damage or destroy
satellites in low Earth orbit.
It is
possible that both could agree to destroy
these systems but verification of compliance would require very intrusive verification measures. Even if this could be
accomplished, there could be concern that
the Soviet Union could quickly replicate
its destroyed system with some confidence
of the effectiveness of the replicated
systems. Whether the Soviet Union would
have the same concern regarding the U.S.
ASAT system presumably would be determined by how much testing of the system
had occurred before the systems were
destroyed. Another approach might be to
concentrate arms control attention on
high altitude systems.

Obviously, the Parties would need to
decide and make clear in the agreement or
in the negotiating record their intention
as to the applicability of a possible
future ASAT agreement during armed hostilities. However, if space systems are
available that are perceived to be capable
of use to directly threaten significant
military assets of either Party to such
an agreement whether those assets be in
space or on Earth, it is doubtful that the
parties would be able to agree that the
agreement applied during period of armed
hostilities. Moreover, the existence of
such systems could serve as a significant
disincentive to even considering the possibility of negotiating an ASAT ban.

Conclusion
An ASAT arms control agreement is not
a magic wand that will make satellites
invulnerable to protection during times
of armed hostilities. Any reasonable
definition of ASAT weapon will leave
uncontrolled some non-weapon uses with a
residual ASAT capability. Verification of
an ASAT arms control agreement poses
problems that must be considered daunting.
The disparity between current ASAT capabilities of the United States and the
Soviet Union adds a further element of
complexity.
Some may conclude from this presentation that the future prospects are bleak
indeed. While it is unreasonable to
conclude, as many suggest, that demilitarization of space or a ban on ASAT
weaponry are panaceas, it is also unreasonable to conclude that nothing useful
can be done in the area of space arms

Since it has already been concluded
that existing international law protects
space objects during peacetime and if a
future ASAT agreement were not applicable
during armed hostilities, what effect
would such an agreement have? The answer
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control. However, it is important in
looking at possible future steps to
appreciate the complexity of the problem
and to keep objectives realistic.
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